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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal causation requirements, in both tort and insurance law, rank among
the most pervasive yet most elusive and most misunderstood of all legal
concepts in Anglo-American law for legal practitioners,1 the courts,' and
academic scholars3 alike. Indeed, no less an authority than William Lloyd
Prosser has stated that there "is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law
which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are
in such a welter of confusion" than proximate cause issues, "despite the
manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject."' 4
Although some commentators have looked upon legal causation's "mys-
tifying riddles" as the "last refuge of muddy thinkers," I the purpose of this
article is to attempt to demystify many of these proximate cause riddles in
1. See, e.g., Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 147 (2000);
Mark D. Wurefel & Mark Koop, "Efficient Proximate Causation" in the Context of Property
Insurance Claims, 65 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 400 (1998); William C. Brewer Jr., Concurrent Cau-
sation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Huffman v. Soreson, 76 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Va. 1953) ("Proximate cause is a
concept difficult to define and almost impossible to explain."); White v. S. Ry., 144 S.E. 424,
429 (Va. 1928) ("Proximate cause is deep and muddy water into which many men, wise and
otherwise, have ventured.").
3. See, e.g., Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735 (1985); PatrickJ.
Kelly, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 49 (1991); Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV.
569 (1987-88); Peter N. Swisher, Insurance Causation Issu es: The Legacy of Bird v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 2 NEv. L.J. 351 (2002).
4. W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984); see also
William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369 (1950); FlemingJames
Jr. & Roger E Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 YLE
L.J. 1 (1967); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543
(1962). And see LEON GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); H.L.A. HART &
ToNY HONOR, CAUSATION IN THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth Vinson, Proximate Cause Should Be Barred from Wandering Outside Neg-
ligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215 (1985) ("In tort law's darkest corners lurks the concept
of proximate cause.... When lawyers and judges toss causation rhetoric into briefs and opin-
ions, the resulting babble smothers common sense and further corrupts legal English.")
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tort actions and insurance coverage disputes and hopefully provide both
the tort law practitioner and the insurance law practitioner with some gen-
eral guidelines and some practical tips for negotiating this often treacher-
ous legal terrain while pleading and proving legal causation requirements.
II. CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS IN
TORT LAW PRACTICE
Although causation requirements play an important role in pleading and
proving intentional torts6 and strict liability tort actions,7 negligence cases
still represent the vast majority of tort actions alleged, presented, settled,
or tried in American courts today. The concept of negligence and the legal
rules associated with negligence therefore dominate the law of torts.'
It is basic hornbook law that in order to successfully bring a tort action
in negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, all four prima facie elements of a negligence cause of action:
(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to use reasonable and ordi-
nary care toward the plaintiff and protect the plaintiff against unreasonable
risks, (2) that the defendant breached this duty to the plaintiff by his or
her unreasonable conduct, (3) that the defendant's unreasonable conduct
was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered actual harm or damages to the
plaintiff's person or property.9
It is not enough, therefore, that the plaintiff's attorney can plead and
prove that the defendant had, and breached, a reasonable duty of care to
the plaintiff and that the plaintiff suffered personal injury or property dam-
ages; the plaintiff's attorney must also plead and prove that the defendant's
negligent actions constituted the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. 10
6. For intentional torts, there is a definite tendency for courts to impose greater respon-
sibility upon a defendant whose conduct was intended to do harm, and more liberal rules are
applied to the consequences for which the defendant will be held liable, the proof required,
and damages recovery permitted. Consequently, for intentional torts, remote causation often
is enough to create liability. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 37 (citing the often-
quoted case of Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925)) ("For an
intended injury, the law is astute to discover even very remote causation.").
7. In products liability actions, including defective warning cases, the plaintiff still has
the burden of pleading and proving that the product defect was the cause-in-fact and the
proximate cause of the harm claimed by the plaintiff. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF
TORTS 1016-18 (2000).
8. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 160-73; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 257-73.
9. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 164-68; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 269-73.
10. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965) ("In order that a negligent
actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not only that the actor's conduct be
negligent toward the other, but also that the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the
other's harm.")
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A. Causation-in-Fact or "but for" Causation
In the great number of negligence cases, courts generally apply a "but for"
test to determine whether the defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact
of the plaintiff's harm, based upon a causal chain of events without any
intervening, superseding causes."I However, there must be a direct causal
connection between the defendant's negligent conduct and the plaintiff's
injury rather than an indirect or remote causal connection; and, conse-
quently, a major problem with causation-in-fact, standing alone, is the
problem of unlimited causal liability based on remote causation. Accord-
ing to Professor Charles Carpenter, this cause-in-fact test, standing alone,
"would impose liability for acts very remote in time and space, and where
the defendant's act was a most insignificant and incidental factor. It would
frequently require the imposition of liability in cases where it would be
absurd to do so. '12
1. Multiple Concurrent Causation and the Substantial Factor Rule
Another important legal concept involving causation-in-fact, as a variation
to the "but for" causation rule, involves multiple concurrent causation and
the "substantial factor" rule. The substantial factor rule may be briefly sum-
marized as follows: If two, or more, causes concur to bring about an event
and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to
cause the identical result, then each cause-in-fact has played so important
a part in producing the result that legal responsibility should be imposed
upon it as a substantial factor of the ultimate result." There may be more
than one substantial factor in a causal chain of events.
Case law in a majority of states today broadly recognizes this substantial
factor concept for causation-in-fact, 14 and it has likewise been incorporated
11. See generally Wex Malone, Ruminations in Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956);
Wright, supra note 3.
12. Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REv.
229, 235 (1932).
13. This substantial factor concept was first introduced by Professor Jeremiah Smith in
Legal Causes of Action in Torts, 25 HARV. L. Rtv. 101,223,229 (1911), and was adopted in the
seminal case of Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W 45
(Minn. 1920). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 265-68; 3 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 384-87 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (holding that
the substantial factor test for proving causation-in-fact is a relatively broad one, requiring
only that the contribution of individual causes be more than negligible or theoretical; thus,
a causal force that plays only an infinitesimal or theoretical part in bringing about an injury
or loss is not a substantial factor); see also Sharp v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 569 P.2d 178,
181 (Alaska 1977); Ekberg v. Greene, 588 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1979); Flom v. Flom, 291
N.W2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980); Clark v. Leisure Vehicles Inc., 292 N.W2d 630, 632 (Wis.
1980) (similar holdings).
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into the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' So although the substantial factor
rule may not be completely synonymous with the "but for" rule, many
courts in practice usually lump these two rules together in determining
causation-in-fact issues. 6
2. Identifying the Defendant Who Caused the Plaintiff's Injuries
The plaintiff's attorney generally has the burden of proof to show, through
direct evidence 7 or circumstantial evidence,'" that the defendant was the
cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Moreover, the defendant's negli-
gence must have been the probable cause, rather than merely a possible
cause, of the plaintiff's injuries. 9
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,2 ° a plaintiff's attorney may also
ask the jury to infer negligence on the part of the defendant in the absence
of any direct or circumstantial evidence and in the absence of any proof of
negligence whatever.2' However, although the plaintiff generally has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 states that an actor's negligent conduct is a legal
cause of harm to another if his or her conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm. See also Thacker v. UNR Indus. Inc., 603 N.E.2d 449 (I11. 992) (holding that under
the substantial factor test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, the defendant's conduct is
said to be the cause-in-fact of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing the event about; in other words, the test requires the alleged tortfeasor's conduct to
be somehow "responsible" for producing the injury at issue).
16. See, e.g., Sharp, 569 P.2d at 180 (Normally, in order to satisfy the substantial factor test,
it must be shown both that the accident would not have happened "but for" the defendant's
negligence and that the negligent act was so important in bringing about the injury that rea-
sonable men would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it.).
17. There is no need to draw any inferences from direct evidence because the only is-
sues are the credibility and reliability of eyewitnesses. For example, if P is suing D for her
personal injuries, claiming that D was negligently speeding in his automobile, X's eyewitness
testimony that she observed D driving very fast is a form of direct evidence; and the impact
of this direct evidence will largely depend on the jury's determination of X's credibility, based
upon X's demeanor in court, and other relevant factors. See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 80 (2nd ed. 2000).
18. Circumstantial evidence is the most common form of evidence utilized by the plaintiff's
attorney to prove that the defendant acted negligently, and drawing inference of fact from cir-
cumstantial evidence is largely a matter of assessing probabilities rather than possibilities of
negligence. See, e.g., DoBBs, supra note 7, at 361-65.
19. See, e.g., S. States Coop. v. Doggett, 292 S.E.2d 331,335 (Va. 1982); see also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms. 43 E3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying California law) (holding that
plaintiffs had the burden of proving an epidemiological causal risk factor of at least 2.0 or
higher in mothers who took Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness).
20. ("The thing speaks for itself.") But as some critics have asked, "Res ipsa loquitur, sed
quid in infernos dicet?" ("The thing speaks for itself, but what the hell does it say?")
21. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, The Doctrine ofReslpsa Loquitur, I U. CHI. L. REv. 519
(1934); Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference, 4 LA. L. REv. 70 (1941); McLarty, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REv. 55 (1951). See generally KEETON
ET AL., supra note 4, at 242-51; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 370-89.
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acts or omissions were the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, there are rare instances when the courts will shift this burden of
proof by requiring the defendants to prove that they were not the actual
cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries.
a. Summers v. Tice: The Alternative Liability Theory-In the case of Sum-
mers v. Tice,22 plaintiff, who was injured in a hunting accident, could not
prove which of two other hunters shooting in his direction had actually
fired the shotgun pellet that wounded plaintiff in the eye. Under a tra-
ditional "but for" causation analysis, plaintiff would be unable to prove
more likely than not that either one of defendants was the probable cause
of his injury. However, neither defendant was innocent, both having
breached a reasonable duty of care to plaintiff by firing in his direction,
and the cause of the injury was necessarily the result of one of them. In
order to solve this dilemma, the Summers v. Tice court shifted the burden
of proof to require that defendants prove that they were not the cause of
plaintiff's injury; and if defendants were unable to exculpate themselves,
then both defendants would be found liable as joint tortfeasors.23
This "alternative liability" theory of Summers v. Tice has been recog-
nized by a number of other courts24 and has also been adopted into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, providing that (1) where the tortious
conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the
plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seek to limit their liability on
the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the
burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor;2" and
(2) where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious and it is proved
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there
is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such
actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.2 6 Other than these par-
ticular exceptions to the general rule, however, the burden of proof that
the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused harm to the plaintiff is
still upon the plaintiff.27
22. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Wysocki v. Reed, 583 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (involving two manu-
facturers of an allegedly defective drug); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co. Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1199
(Ohio 1984) (two suppliers of an explosive compound); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W2d
164 (Mich. 1984) (a DES case with all possible defendants joined in the action); McMillan
v. Mahoney, 393 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. 1990) (two boys firing air rifles). But see contra Senn v.
Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc. 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1998) (rejecting this alternative causation theory
in a pharmaceutical vaccine case).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B (2).
26. Id. § 433B (3).
27. Id. § 433B (1).
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b. Market Share and Enterprise Liability Theories-In the case of Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories," the California Supreme Court held that plaintiff, who
could not prove which of 200 different companies produced the diethylstil-
bestrol (DES) that allegedly caused her injuries, need only join a substan-
tial market share percentage of the manufacturers of the DES drug, and
the burden of proof of causation would then shift to defendants to appor-
tion damages according to their market share of the DES drug. 9
A number of other courts, however, have rejected this theory of "market
share liability" absent any state legislation adopting such a theory of recov-
ery,30 and still other courts have limited market share liability only to DES
cases, which involved identical products that were manufactured by 200
companies, in contrast to asbestos products and other marketed products
that were not identically manufactured."s
Other courts have adopted the concept of "enterprise liability," or in-
dustrywide liability. For example, in the case of Hall v. DuPont,12 thirteen
minor plaintiffs were injured in separate explosions caused by allegedly
defective blasting caps. Defendants were the American blasting cap trade
association and six blasting cap manufacturers that accounted for nearly all
of the U.S. blasting cap industry, and each defendant had manufactured its
blasting caps in adherence to industrywide standards. The court held that
under these circumstances, the burden of proof on the issue of causation
would shift from plaintiffs, who had no way of identifying which defen-
dants made which blasting caps, to defendants.33 However, the concept of
enterprise liability, as well as market share liability, to date has not gained
wide acceptance in many courts.
3 4
B. Proximate (or Legal) Causation
Because "but for" causation-in-fact, standing alone, will often impose li-
ability for extremely remote and insignificant causes,3" tort practitioners
28. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
29. See also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 541 N.YS.2d 941 (N.Y), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994
(1989); McCormick v. Abbott Labs., 617 E Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985) (also adopting market
share liability for DES manufacturers).
30. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zaft v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 676 S.W2d 241 (Mo. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Goldman v. Johns Manville Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (asbestos);
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985) (asbestos); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 721 E Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), affd, 898 E2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (breast implants).
32. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 E Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 794 E Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 3
E3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 E3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying
Texas law) (expressly rejecting these theories of causal liability).
35. See Carpenter, supra note 12, and accompanying text.
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must also plead and prove that the defendant's negligent conduct was the
proximate (or legal) cause of the plaintiff's damages.3 6 And over the past
four centuries, from the time of Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon's first
maxim of the law, In jure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur,37 courts
and commentators have been struggling mightily to properly understand,
and to correctly apply, the concept of proximate causation to present-day
negligence actions.38
In practice, however, most courts have long implicitly understood, and
most tort practitioners have long suspected, that the concept of proximate
cause is very different from the concept of cause-in-fact39 and has very little
to do with causation principles per se. Rather, according to prevailing con-
temporary American tort law theory and practice, proximate cause can best
be understood as a limitation to tort liability primarily based upon public
policy grounds, rather than based upon underlying causation principles.
1. Proximate Cause as a Limitation to Liability Based
upon Public Policy Grounds
It may seem strange that after centuries of trying to understand and sys-
tematically apply historically based proximate cause concepts to negligence
actions, the majority of contemporary courts and commentators today
have basically discarded a causally connected definition of proximate cause
and instead have adopted a public policy definition.
According to Professor Prosser,
Proximate cause-in itself an unfortunate term-is merely the limitation
which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the conse-
quences of the actor's conduct.... As a practical matter, legal responsibility
must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result
36. See, e.g., James Jr. & Perry, supra note 4, at 761 (noting that a legal causation test
includes a requirement that the wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of the harm, but if
this stood alone, the scope of liability would be vast indeed.... But the law has not stopped
there-it has developed further restrictions and limitations. The concept this development
has produced is generally called "proximate" or "legal" cause.).
37. (In law not the remote cause, but the proximate cause, it looked to.) Lord Chancellor
Francis Bacon, Maxims of the Law (1630), reprinted in 7 JAMES SPEDDING ET AL., THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BAcON 327 (1870).
38. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 3, at 105 ("And so we go round and round, locked in a relent-
less rivalry between the normative and descriptive poles of a single fallacious theory in which
the real proximate cause question cannot be asked."); Etheridge v. S.R.R., 129 S.E. 680, 683
(Va. 1925) (concluding that legal causation "has not only troubled the unlearned, but has
vexed the erudite"; nevertheless, "it has grown to be a part of the livery of the law of negli-
gence, and it is too late to discard it"); see also supra notes 1-5 and authority cited therein.
39. See, e.g., Snyder v. LTG Luftechnische GmbH, 955 S.W2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn. 1997)
("The distinction between cause in fact and proximate, or legal, cause is not merely an exer-
cise in semantics. The terms are not interchangeable. Although both cause in fact and proxi-
mate, or legal, cause are elements of negligence that the plaintiff must prove, they are very
different concepts.")
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and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the
basis of some social idea of justice or policy.4°
Professor Dobbs also agrees that "[t]he proximate cause issue, in spite
of the terminology, is not about causation at all, but about the appropriate
scope of responsibility."' 41 And, as the Tennessee Supreme Court recently
stated,
[piroximate or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or the
courts to deny liability for otherwise actionable conduct based on consider-
ations of logic, common sense, policy, [and] precedent, and "our more or less
inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands or what is administra-
tively possible and convenient." 42
For example, in the case of Enright v. Eli Lilly Co. ,43 the New York Court of
Appeals held, for public policy reasons under a proximate cause rationale,
that recovery to people who were injured by the miscarriage preventative
drug DES would be limited only to mothers and their children who were
injured by in utero exposure to DES even though "the rippling effects of
DES exposure may extend to generations," because "it is our duty to con-
fine liability within manageable limits." 44
Thus, it would seem appropriate for a plaintiff's attorney to argue that
such proximate cause principles ought to include the factual events sur-
rounding his or her particular case-and for a defense attorney to argue
that proximate cause principles ought to limit such liability-based upon
underlying public policy arguments, as well as based upon more traditional
historically centered causation arguments.
4
1
2. Proximate Cause Based upon Concepts of Foreseeability
The rationale for proximate cause's limitation to liability based on underly-
ing public policy reasons, however, was not created in a vacuum; and most
courts today in determining whether a defendant's act, or omission to act,
was too remote or did in fact constitute the proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injuries still justify their decisions based upon concepts of foreseeability.
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 264.
41. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 443.
42. Snyder, 955 S.W2d at 256 n.6 (citing as authority Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W2d 618, 625
(Tenn. 1997)); George v. Alexander, 931 S.W2d 517, 521 (Tenn. 1996).
43. Enright v. Eli Lilly Co., 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. 1991)
44. Id. at 558; see also Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (similar
holding).
45. For example, a plaintiff or defense attorney might want to justify their public policy
proximate cause argument based upon a "law and economics" underlying rationale (or not).
See, e.g., William Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economics Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STrUIES 109 (1983); Mark Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IowA
L. REv. 363 (1984).
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This proximate cause requirement of foreseeability, as discussed in more
detail below, includes (1) the foreseeability of the plaintiff or a rescuer,
(2) the foreseeability of harm in a direct causal chain of events, (3) the
foreseeability or unforeseeability of intervening causes, and (4) the foresee-
ability of the extent of harm.
a. The Foreseeable Plaintiff and the Foreseeable Rescuer-In Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co.,46 arguably the most celebrated (or, some would argue,
the most notorious) tort case in American jurisprudence, the New York
Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting conclusions as to whether proxi-
mate causation should be characterized in terms of a duty to an unfore-
seeable plaintiff or whether proximate causation should more properly be
based upon foreseeable or unforeseeable causal consequences.
The facts of this case were that a passenger was running to catch one of
defendant's trains at a railroad station. Defendant's guards, attempting to
assist the passenger in boarding the train, negligently dislodged a pack-
age from the passenger's arms, causing it to fall on the rails. The package
contained fireworks, which exploded with some violence. This concussion
allegedly overturned some scales "many feet" from where the package fell,
which in turn injured Mrs. Palsgraf, another railroad passenger who was
waiting on the station platform for another train to depart.47 In a four-
to-three decision written by Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo speaking
for the majority, the court defined proximate cause in terms of a duty to
plaintiff, and no duty would be owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff such as
Mrs. Palsgraf, who was not in a foreseeable "zone of danger."
The first Restatement of Torts (to which Judge Cardozo conveniently
served as an advisor) almost immediately accepted Cardozo's view that
there is no duty, and hence there is no negligence and no tort liability, to an
unforeseeable plaintiff who is not within a "foreseeable zone of danger.
48
A number of courts today still recognize this underlying rationale forJudge
Cardozo's decision in Palsgraf.49
46. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y 1928).
47. A study of the record, however, indicates that this event could not possibly have hap-
pened in this way. Ordinary fireworks were involved here, not a bomb; and plaintiff's original
complaint, before it was amended, alleged that the scale was knocked over by a stampede of
frightened passengers rather than by the concussion. Also, plaintiff's attorney, in a motion for
reargument, pointed out that Mrs. Palsgraf stood much closer to the scene of the fireworks
explosion than the majority opinion in Palsgraf suggested. See generally William L. Prosser,
PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953); WH. Manz, Palsgraf Cardozo's Urban Legend?,
107 DICK. L. REV. 785 (2003).
48. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 285.
49. See, e.g., Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 916 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1996); Edwards v.
Honeywell Inc., 50 E3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Indiana law); Radigan v. W.J. Halloran
Co., 196 A.2d 160 (R.I. 1963); Tucker v. Collar, 285 P.2d 178 (Ariz. 1955).
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Three judges, however, dissented in Palsgraf in an equally persuasive
opinion written by Judge Andrews. Judge Andrews voiced the more tra-
ditional view that proximate causation "is a term of convenience, of public
policy, of a rough sense of justice" and not only "is he wronged to whom
harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he is also [harmed] who
is in fact injured even if he be outside what would generally be thought the
danger zone."50 Andrews therefore characterized proximate cause more in
terms of foreseeability of harm and causation rather than as a duty to plain-
tiff. And, not surprisingly, the first Restatement of Torts also adopted Judge
Andrews's rationale of proximate causation.5 Andrews's Palsgraf dissenting
opinion has been followed in other states as well. 2
Which is the better-reasoned approach? A number of other influential
proximate cause decisions, including the so-called British Boat Cases of In
re Polemis3 and the Wagon Mound cases, 4 appear to followJudge Andrews's
direct versus indirect causal chain of events rationale for proximate cause,
rather than applying Cardozo's duty-relation-risk formula. And various law
school commentators also have criticized Cardozo's duty-relation-risk ap-
proach in Palsgraf5 5
However, in retrospect, Cardozo and Andrews both attempted to limit
tort liability using a proximate cause rationale, within their "rough sense of
justice," whenever public policy considerations made such a limitation to
50. 162 N.E. 99 at 103.
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433 cmt. e; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435.
52. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Universal Metrics Inc., 641 N.W.2d 158 (Wis. 2002);Jackson v.
Lowenstein & Bros., 136 S.W2d 495 (Tenn. 1940).
53. See In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (A.C. 1921) (involving defendant's workman who
negligently allowed a plank to drop into the hold of a ship where a resulting spark ignited
gasoline vapors in the hold; the court applied a direct causation chain of events rationale for
proximate cause even though the ultimate result might not have been foreseeable).
54. See, e.g., Wagon Mound #1, [19611 A.C. 388 (P.C. 1961) (involving the negligent leak
of furnace oil from a ship that caught fire in Sydney Harbor, Australia; the court held that a
direct causal chain of events, as required in Polemis, must also have foreseeable consequences);
Wagon Mound #2, [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (P.C. 1967) (holding that defendant's ship engineer rea-
sonably should have foreseen the resulting harm from the leaking furnace oil on the water);
see also In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 E2d 708 (2nd Cir. 1964) (following the Wagon Mound
rationale by requiring foreseeable harm from a direct causal chain of events for proximate
cause).
55. SeeJerry L. Phillips, Law School Teaching, 45 ST. Louis U. LJ. 725, 727 (2001):
Why does Cardozo confuse generations of law students [and practitioners and judges] by
talking about duty instead of foreseeability? Is it because New York [tort law] was stuck
with the direct-cause rule of proximate causation, and he wanted to avoid applying the
rule? Then why not change the rule from direct cause (Polemis) to foreseeability (Wagon
Mound) instead of talking about duty? Of course, Cardozo was not the first to confuse duty
with proximate cause.
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tort liability appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, when the
situation warrants, courts have applied either or both of these proximate
cause doctrines. 6
In another classic tort case, Wagner v. International Railway," Judge
Cardozo held that because "danger invites rescue," the rescuer was a fore-
seeable plaintiff within the scope of a foreseeable risk of loss. Unfortu-
nately, Cardozo did not make it clear whether he regarded such liability
as an exception to the Palsgraf rule or whether the rescuer was within a
foreseeable zone of danger.5 8
Accordingly, most courts today recognize that a defendant who negli-
gently injures another may also be liable to that person's rescuer under
this danger invites rescue doctrine. 9 The courts have split, however, on
whether professional rescuers, such as firefighters and police officers, may
be barred from recovery under special rules applied to them.60
b. Foreseeable Manner of Harm in a Direct Causal Chain of Events-When
there is a sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's injury, in order to
hold the defendant liable for damages, the cardinal rule of proximate cau-
sation in tort law is that the plaintiff's harm must have been the direct (as
opposed to the indirect or remote) and foreseeable (as opposed to unfore-
seeable) consequence of the defendant's acts in a causal chain of events,
unbroken by any intervening, superseding cause.61 Stated another way, the
proximate cause of an event "is that act or omission [of the defendant]
56. See, e.g., Dahlsgtrom v. Shrum, 84 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1951); Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., 582 N.W2d 916 (Minn. 1998); Universal Metrics, 641 N.W2d at 158; see also DOBBS,
supra note 7, at 457:
Palsgraf differs from Wagon Mound in detail, but not in fundamental thrust. The fundamen-
tal thrust is that liability for negligence is limited to the risks negligently created by the de-
fendant. The difference in detail is that the risk at issue in Wagon Mound could be described
as a risk of a certain type or class of harm, while the risk in Palsgraf could be described as
a risk to a certain class of persons. Many, many common law cases are consistent with the
scope of risk rules both in the language of foreseeability and in their results.
Id.
57. Wagner v. Int'l Ry., 153 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
58. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 456.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 445; see, e.g., Solomon v. SheuU, 457 N.W2d 669
(Mich. 1990) (holding that rescuers as a class are foreseeable); Tri-State Wholesale Associated
Growers Inc. v. Barera, 917 S.W2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1996) ("Our jurisprudence is well-
settled that the acts of rescuers are generally the foreseeable results of negligent activity.")
60. See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663 (NJ. 1983); Lipson v. Superior Court, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (Cal. 1982); Greene v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 74 . Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Va.
1999); see also Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fire-
man Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 AL.R.4th 597 (1981); Richard C. Tinney,
Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Police Officers Coming Thereon in Dis-
cbarge of Officer's Duty, 30 A.L.R.4th 81 (1981).
61. See generally KEETON FT A., supra note 4, at 272-300; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 451-70.
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which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient in-
tervening cause, produces the event, and without which that event would
not have occurred." 62 But herein lies the rub. If proximate cause normally
is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury,63 how does the trier of fact
determine whether the resulting harm is foreseeable or not?
The classic Kinsman Transit cases,64 arguably the American equivalent of
the British Wagon Mound cases,6 illustrate this foreseeability of harm co-
nundrum in a direct causal chain of events. In these cases, employees of the
Kinsman Transit Company negligently moored a ship, the Shivas, at a dock
in the Buffalo River, three miles above a lift bridge maintained by the City
of Buffalo, New York. Due to ice and debris in the river, the mooring lines
pulled out from the improperly anchored mooring block. The Shivas broke
loose and drifted downstream, colliding with another ship, the Tewksbury,
and both ships floated down the river together toward the bridge. Frantic
telephone calls to workers on the bridge to raise it in time for the two
ships went unanswered because one bridge crew had gone off duty and the
other bridge crew was late. The ships crashed into the center of the bridge,
causing it to collapse, backing up the river, and causing extensive property
damage up and down the river.
The federal district court jury found negligence and liability on the part
of Kinsman and the City of Buffalo, holding that the particular events in
this direct causal chain of events were foreseeable and unbroken by any
unforeseeable intervening causes. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, although Judge Friendly warned that "other American courts,
purporting applying a test of foreseeability to damages, extend that con-
cept to such unforeseeable lengths as to raise serious doubt whether the
concept is meaningful: indeed we wonder whether the British courts are
not finding it necessary to limit the language of the Wagon Mound [cases]."
Most courts ultimately realize, however, "that there must be some limita-
tion to this. Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that
the [causal] link has become too tenuous [and] that what is claimed to be
consequence is only fortuity.
'66
62. See, e.g., Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Va. 2003).
63. Id. But see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (2) (holding that the court,
applying its judicial discretion, may determine in retrospect that the causal chain of events
was highly extraordinary and therefore unforeseeable). See, e.g., infra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
64. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 E2d 708 (2nd Cir. 1964) (Kinsman No. 1); In re
Kinsman Transit Co., 388 E2d 821 (2nd Cir. 1968) (Kinsman No. 2).
65. See supra note 54.
66. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 E2d at 708, 724-25. However, in the subsequent case of
In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 E2d 821, the court held that related economic loss resulting
from this causal chain of events was unforeseeable; and, therefore, there was no liability in this
case for negligence based upon proximate causation principles.
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Is there a viable resolution to this interpretive conundrum? A number
of American courts, in determining foreseeability of harm, have made a
distinction between the particular manner of harm and the general type of
harm suffered by the plaintiff, as propounded by Professors Fowler Harper
and Fleming James Jr. in their influential torts treatise.67 For example, in
the celebrated "flaming rat" case, 68 defendant instructed plaintiff to clean
a coin-operated machine with gasoline in a small room where there was a
lighted gas heater nearby with an open flame. While plaintiff was cleaning
the machine with gasoline, a rat escaped from under the machine and ran
to take refuge under the heater, where its fur, now impregnated with gaso-
line fumes, caught fire from the flame. The rat then "returned in haste" to
its original hideout under the coin-operated machine, which then exploded
in flames, badly injuring plaintiff.
The Daniels court held that although the particular manner of harm
might have been unforeseeable (i.e., that a flaming rat returning to its
hideout under the coin-operated machine might have ignited the gasoline
under this highly unusual causal chain of events), the general type of harm
was foreseeable (i.e., that the use of gasoline near an open flame may cause
an explosion and fire).69
Another equally bizarre case involved a nude eleven-year-old boy who
was riding a canister vacuum cleaner as if it were a toy car. His penis slipped
through the canister casing and was amputated by the vacuum cleaner fan
blades traveling at approximately 20,000 revolutions per minute. Although
the particular manner of harm was unforeseeable (as almost everyone
would agree), the general type of harm (the possibility of cutting off one's
finger or another appendage as a result of the unprotected fan blades) was
held to be foreseeable.7"
67. See, e.g., FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTS 162-63 (2nd ed. 1986) ("Foresee-
ability does not mean that the precise hazard or the exact consequences that were encoun-
tered should have been foreseen.") Professors Harper and James therefore argued for a more
expansive "enterprise liability" approach to proximate cause and foreseeability of harm issues
in most tort law disputes:
As the fact of insurance and loss distribution increasingly permeates our system, and the
importance of individual blameworthiness wanes, the limitation (of proximate cause, or
duty, etc.) may be expected to take on more and more the character of limitations measured
by what is felt to be normally incidental to the kind of activity or enterprise that is footing
the bill.
Id. at 131. Prosser Prosser, like Judge Friendly,. was skeptical of Harper and James's more
expansive approach to proximate cause and foreseeability of harm issues. "Harper and James'
torts treatise is very impressive and comprehensive," Professor Prosser told my first-year torts
class in 1971, "but it can be summarized in one sentence: The plaintiff always wins."
68. United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949).
69. Id.; see also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y 1980) (similar
holding involving a plaintiff who burst into flames as a result of another highly unusual causal
chain of events).
70. See LaRue v. Nat'l Elec. Corp., 571 E2d 51 (1st Cir. 1978) (applying Massachusetts law).
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This important interpretive rule involving foreseeability of harm has also
been codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 (1), which provides
thus: "If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable."7 However, on the other hand, if a causal sequence
of events in retrospect appears to the court to be highly extraordinary and
therefore unforeseeable, then the court, applying its judicial discretion,
may hold that the defendant is not liable under this same proximate cause
principle.72
For example, in the case of Banks v. City of Richmond,73 defendant, a city
employee, negligently failed to correct a gas leak in an apartment oven by
turning off the gas meter. Stahl, a maintenance man from the apartment's
rental office, lit a cigarette lighter in order to detect the source of the gas
leak and was blown through the kitchen cabinets by the resulting explosion.
The Virginia Supreme Court, citing Restatement of Torts § 43 5 with approval,
held that what Stahl did was so "highly extraordinary" that it "completely
overshadowed" any negligence of the city, and therefore the city's failure
to turn off the gas was, at most, a "remote cause. '74 On the other hand,
plaintiff's attorney might make an equally compelling general type of harm
argument that plaintiff's resulting injuries were, in fact, foreseeable."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts cautions, however, that it
is impossible to state any definite rules by which it can be determined that
a particular result of the actor's negligent conduct is or is not so highly ex-
traordinary as to prevent the conduct from being a legal cause of that result.
This is a matter for the judgment of the court formulated after the event, and
therefore with the knowledge of the effect that was produced.76
c. Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Intervening Causes-In an intervening
proximate cause situation, the original defendant normally creates and sets
in force a causal chain of events, but the immediate trigger of the plaintiff's
harm is another person or persons or a force of nature. So is the original
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (2) provides thus: "The actor's conduct may be
held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event, and looking back from
the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it
should have brought about the harm." Id.
73. Banks v. City of Richmond, 438 S.E.2d 280 (Va. 1986).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 185 So. 234 (Miss. 1938) (holding that a rea-
sonable person should have anticipated a sudden fire and explosion from a defective gasoline
container, even if the cause of the spark, as the particular manner of harm, might not have
been foreseeable).
76. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. e.
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defendant still liable for the plaintiff's ultimate injuries or not? This de-
pends on whether the subsequent intervening causes were foreseeable or
unforeseeable.
It is generally held that a foreseeable intervening cause will not break the
causal chain of events, and therefore the original defendant, as well as sub-
sequent negligent defendants, if any, may still be liable to the plaintiff in
the causal chain of events. An unforeseeable intervening and superseding
cause, on the other hand, will relieve the original defendant from liability
for his or her negligence.77
If an intervening cause in the causal chain of events is an act of God, or a
natural event, and such an event is foreseeable, then the original defendant
in the causal chain of events generally is not relieved of liability. However,
if an act of God, or natural event, is "such an extraordinary manifestation
of the forces of nature that it could not under normal circumstances have
been anticipated or expected," then it will constitute an unforeseeable in-
tervening, superseding cause.7"
Intervening intentional or criminal acts are generally regarded as a su-
perseding cause to an actor's original negligence unless the actor, at the
time of his negligent conduct, realized, or should have realized, the likeli-
hood that such a situation might have been created and that a third person
might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such an intentional tort
or crime.79
However, practitioners and courts are still faced with the interpretive
conundrum of trying to decide whether an intervening force is a foresee-
able intervening cause or is an unforeseeable and superseding, intervening
cause. Fortunately, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 provides some
welcome guidance in this area:
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an
intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
77. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 434 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y. 1980); Tise
v. Yates Constr. Co., 480 S.E.2d 677 (1997). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at
301-19; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 460-63; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 442,
477 (1965).
78. See, e.g., S. Ry. v. Jefferson, 38 S.E.2d 334 (Va. 1946) (extraordinary and unusual flood
damage); see also Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848
(Utah 1994) (unforeseeable flooding); Bradford v. Universal Constr. Co., 644 So. 2d 864 (Ala.
1994) (foreseeable high winds). And see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451. See generally
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 314-21; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 474-76.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448; see, e.g., Alamo Rent-a-Car Inc. v.
Hamilton, 455 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Phan Son Van v. Pena, 990 S.W2d 751 (Tex.
1999); Burns v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448 (Va. 1995). See generally KEETON ET AL., snpra note 4,
at 312-13; DOBBS, supra note 7, at 470-74.
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(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the
event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances
existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situa-
tion created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a
normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's
act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is
wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability
to him; and
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act or of a third person which sets
the intervening force in motion. 0
And, once again, a plaintiff's attorney should strategically emphasize the
general type of harm suffered by the plaintiff rather than the particular
manner of harm,8 while the defendant's attorney will want to emphasize
the highly extraordinary and unforeseeable particular manner of the plain-
tiff's harm in the sequence of causal events.82
d. Foreseeable Extent of Harm-Courts generally distinguish between the
nature of harm and the extent of harm suffered by a plaintiff in disputes in-
volving actual and proximate causation.83 For example, in the classic "egg-
shell skull" case,84 defendant was held liable in negligence to plaintiff with
a thin skull who suffered death, when an ordinary man would only have
suffered a mild bump on the head.8" The general rule, therefore, is that the
defendant must "take the plaintiff as he finds him" even if the defendant's
negligent act or omission caused unforeseeable consequences resulting
from a plaintiff's preexisting physical condition.86 A number of courts also
include the fragile psyche of a plaintiff as well as his or her fragile health in
"taking the plaintiff as you find him or her."87
e. Function of the Court and the Jury in Causation Cases-Finally, in negli-
gence cases involving actual and proximate causation issues, it is generally
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442.
81. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435.
84. See, e.g., Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901).
85. Id.; see also David v. DeLeon, 547 N.W2d 726 (Neb. 1996).
86. See, e.g., Fuller v. Merten, 22 P.3d 1221 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Watford v. Morse, 118
S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1961); Thompson v. Lupone, 62 A.2d 861 (Conn. 1948).
87. See, e.g., Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. 1984) (psychotic breakdown
triggered by a four-car collision); Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2nd Cir. 1970)
(schizophrenia triggered by an automobile accident); see also Mum v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1991) (applying Mississippi law) (holding that Mississippi applies the "eggshell skull" rule
only to preexisting medical conditions). See generally DOBBS, sapra note 7, at 464-66.
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the function of the court to determine (a) whether the evidence as to the
facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably differ concerning
the conduct of the defendant as a substantial factor in causing harm to the
plaintiff, (b) whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment
among two or more causes, and (c) the question of causation and appor-
tionment in any case in which the jury may not reasonably differ.88
It is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in which it may
reasonably differ on the issue, (a) whether the defendant's conduct has been
a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff, and (b) the apportion-
ment of the harm to two or more causes.89
III. CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS IN INSURANCE
LAW PRACTICE
90
Because most research and analysis of legal causation issues have largely
occurred in the context of tort law,9 many courts have applied these clas-
sic tort proximate cause principles to insurance contract disputes as well.
Thus, as an earlier commentator has noted,
Among the decided cases, it is generally taken to be beyond dispute that prox-
imate cause is proximate cause, wherever it may be found, and the court is
content with a brief definition in the traditional [tort] manner. The rule in in-
surance cases appears to be that the definition of proximate cause which should
be applied is the same or substantially the same as in negligence cases. 92
However, a substantial body of case law and legal commentary demon-
strates that there are many important differences, as well as similarities,
between legal causation issues in tort law and insurance law,9 and that
general rules of proximate causation often are applied in a different, and
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434 (1).
89. See id. § 434 (2).
90. A significant portion of the legal analysis within this section originally appeared in two
prior articles: Swisher, supra note 3; and Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach
to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000). These
important insurance causation principles are summarized below.
91. See generally supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
92. Brewer Jr., supra note 1, at 1167 (1961); see a/so JEFFREY STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CoNTRAcTs §§ 7.01-7.03 (3rd ed. 2006) (discussing causation doctrines in insurance law).
93. See, e.g., Sidney Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AM. Bus. L.J. 33 (1972-73);
Douglas Houser & Christopher Kent, Concurrent Causation in First Party Insurance Claims:
Consumers Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 573 (1985-86); Craig Lit-
sey, Property Insurance Coverage and Policy Exrclusions: Problems of Multiple Causation, 35 INS.
CouNs. Q. 415 (1985); McDowell, supra note 3; Douglas Houser, The Rise and Fall of Concur-
rent Causation: Background and Current Trends Affecting Property Insurance Coverage, 44 FED.
INS. & CORP. CotNs. Q. 3 (1993); Wurefel & Koop, supra note 1; Haley, supra note 1; Swisher,
supra note 3.
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more literal, manner in an insurance law context than in a traditional tort
action. As Justice Felix Frankfurter noted in the case of Standard Oil Co. v.
United States:94
Unlike obligations flowing from duties imposed upon people willy-nilly, an
insurance policy is a voluntary undertaking by which obligations are volun-
tarily assumed. Therefore the subtleties and sophistries of tort liability for
negligence are not to be applied in construing the covenants [of an insurance
policy]. It is one thing for the law to impose liability by its own terms of re-
sponsibility [as in a tort law context] and quite another to construe the scope
of engagements bought and paid for [as in an insurance law context].95
Professor Banks McDowell also distinguishes between the prima facie
elements to establish a traditional tort action and the necessary elements
involved in an insurance coverage dispute. According to Professor William
Lloyd Prosser, in order to establish a bona fide tort cause of action sound-
ing in negligence, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of due care; (2) the
defendant breached this duty of due care to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant's
acts were the causal connection between the conduct and the resulting in-
jury, i.e., the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss;
and (4) actual loss or damage occurred to the plaintiff as a result of the
defendant's actions. 96
With insurance contract disputes, however, according to Professor
McDowell, four different factors need to be considered: (1) the coverage
provisions of an insurance policy (or, more generally, the promise in the
contract), (2) the occurrence of the event (or, more generally, the breach),
(3) the loss or damage, and (4) the causal "connector" between the event and
the loss.97 Note, however, that Professor Prosser and Professor McDowell
both speak of the causation requirement as a connector or connection be-
tween the occurrence and the loss. So there are important similarities, as
well as important differences, regarding the necessary tort and insurance
causal requirement.
A. Evolution of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine in
Insurance Coverage Disputes
One crucial distinction between tort and insurance causation principles is
the "reasonable expectations of the parties" doctrine as an important inter-
pretive factor in insurance causation disputes, which was first enunciated
94. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950).
95. Id. at 66.
96. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 164--68; see also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 269-73.
97. McDowell, supra note 3, at 575.
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in Benjamin Cardozo's seminal property insurance case of Bird v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co.98
The facts of Bird were as follows: Like Polemis, Wagon Mound, and the
Kinsman cases, 99 the Bird case involved a damaged vessel, which was in-
sured under a fire and marine insurance policy by the St. Paul Insurance
Company. On the night of July 30, 1916, a fire of unknown cause broke
out beneath some railroad freight cars in New York Harbor. The railroad
cars were loaded with explosives; and after the fire had burned for approxi-
mately thirty minutes, the contents of the railroad cars exploded. This ex-
plosion caused another fire, which in turn caused another and much greater
explosion of a large quantity of dynamite and other explosives stored in the
freight yard. This last explosion caused a concussion of air, which damaged
plaintiff's vessel about 1,000 feet distant. No fire reached the vessel.
The question forJudge Cardozo was whether this loss was covered under
St. Paul's fire insurance policy provisions, which provided coverage for a
"direct loss caused by fire." Although Cardozo conceded that there "is no
doubt when fire spreads to an insured building and there causes an explo-
sion, the insurer is liable for all damages," 100 and although the trial court
had found for the plaintiff policyholder, Cardozo nevertheless reversed and
rendered judgment for the defendant insurer largely based upon insurance
proximate cause principles.
Initially, Cardozo's reasoning appeared to parallel the direct versus in-
direct causation argument utilized in Polemis °1 and in Andrews's dissent in
Palsgraf102 First, Cardozo opined that the damage to the vessel constituted
"damage by concussion, and concussion is not fire nor the immediate con-
sequences of fire."103 Then Cardozo discussed the important insurance law
proximate cause issue involved in this case:
The case, therefore, comes to this: Fire must reach the thing insured, or come
within such proximity to it that damage, direct or indirect, is within the com-
pass of reasonable probability. Then only is it a proximate cause, because then
only may we suppose that it was within the contemplation of the contracting
parties, and not merely in the physical bond of union between events, which
solves, at least for the jurist, this problem of causation.' °4
Here, then, was the underlying rationale, and the genius, of Cardozo's
proximate cause analysis involving this insurance coverage dispute. Proximate
98. 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1918).
99. See supra notes 53-54, 64-66, and accompanying text.
100. 120 N.E. at 86.
101. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
103. 120 N.E. at 87.
104. Id. at 88.
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cause in an insurance law context should not always be determined solely
through an objective tort test of foreseeable harm, as applied in the Wagon
Mound and Kinsman cases. l05 Rather, proximate cause in insurance coverage
disputes must also be determined according to the reasonable expectations
of the contracting parties: "General definitions of a proximate cause give lit-
tle aid. Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary
business man when making a business contract. It is his intention, express or
fairly to be inferred, that counts."' 6
This evolutionary (some would say revolutionary) definition of proxi-
mate cause principles in an insurance law context, applicable to both the
insured and the insurer alike,0 7 arguably was an important precursor to
Professor Arthur Corbin's famous first axiom of contract law: "The Main
Purpose of Contract Law is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations
Induced by Promises."'0 8
Moreover, Cardozo's contractually based reasonable expectations doc-
trine enunciated in Bird arguably led to an increased utilization, through
a number of contractually based reasonable expectations rights and rem-
edies, of important insurance law interpretive rules in order to determine
the scope of the parties' intent, contractual duties, and obligations and the
meaning of disputed terms in an insurance contract, including (1) the doc-
trine of ambiguities or contra proferentem; (2) contract unconscionability
and public policy issues; (3) equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable
estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and contract reformation; and
(4) a number of other interpretive rules applied to standardized insurance
contracts as contracts of adhesion.'(9
Indeed, this contractually based reasonable expectations doctrine was
firmly established at the time Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton pro-
pounded his groundbreaking 1970 "rights at variance with the policy lan-
guage" reasonable expectations doctrine."l0 However, a significant majority
105. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
106. 120 N.E. at 87.
107. In a subsequent decision, Smith v. Northwestern Fire &Marine Insurance Co., 159 N.E. 87,
92 (N.Y. 1927), Cardozo recognized that insurers as well as insureds could invoke this contrac-
tually based reasonable expectations doctrine. See also RobertJerry HI, Insurance, Contract, and the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. LJ. 21, 32 (1998-99) ("Cardozo viewed reason-
able expectations as a two-way street: each party was entitled to assert them to the other. Thus,
in an insurance setting, Cardozo thought it as important to consider the reasonable expectations
of insurers as it was to examine the [reasonable] expectations held by the insureds.")
108. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1(1952); see also GORDON SCHARBER &
CLAUDE ROWHER, CONTRACTS 147 (3rd ed. 1990) ("One purpose of contract law is to protect
the reasonable expectation of persons who become parties to the bargain.").
109. See generally Swisher, supra note 90, at 735-47.
110. See Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (1970) (Part 1); 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) (Part I). As propounded by Professor
Keeton, this functional (as opposed to contractual) reasonable expectations doctrine is based
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of courts today have expressly rejected the Keeton "rights at variance with
the policy language" reasonable expectations doctrine in favor of a more
traditional contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations largely
based upon the doctrine of ambiguities.'
B. Immediate Cause Versus Efficient or Dominant Proximate Cause
An important legacy of Bird and subsequent insurance causation cases is
the issue of whether the necessary causal nexus for an insurance loss needs
to be the "immediate" cause of the loss or whether it can also be the "ef-
ficient" or "dominant" proximate cause along a causal chain of events. 1 2
American courts have split on this important legal concept." 3
The traditional insurance law rule, based on early English and Ameri-
can precedent, 1 4 is that the cause of loss in an insurance law context must
be the immediate cause of the loss, as opposed to the proximate cause of
the loss.115 The underlying rationale behind this immediate cause test was
upon a two-prong rationale: (1) that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advan-
tage in an insurance contract; and (2) that the reasonable expectations of insurance applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance coverage should be honored,
even though a painstaking study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated
those expectations. Id. at 963-64. A small minority of state courts today have adopted this
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations at variance with the insurance policy lan-
guage. See generally Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After
Three Decades, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 1 (1998-99).
111. See, e.g., Deni Assocs. of Fla. Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135,
1140 (Fla. 1998)
We decline to adopt the [Keeton] doctrine of reasonable expectations. There is no need
for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous because in Florida ambiguities are construed
against the insurer. To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous provision would be to rewrite
the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are charged.
See also Ligatt v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Kan. 2002) ("[Almbiguity is
a condition precedent to the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine."); Wilke v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W2d 776, 787 (Mich. 2003) ("The rule of reasonable ex-
pectations clearly has no application when interpreting an unambiguous contract because a
policyholder cannot be said to have reasonably expected something different from the clear
language of the [insurance] contract."). And see Swisher, supra note 90.
112. Proximate cause in the construction of an insurance policy generally is synonymous
with direct cause, and efficient cause generally means dominant or predominant cause.
113. Professor Jeffrey Stempel characterizes these two causal approaches as (1) the cause
nearest the loss and (2) the dominant cause of loss. See STEMPEL, supra note 92, at 7.02.
114. See, e.g., McDonald v. Snelling, 96 Mass. 290, 294 (1867) ("[C]ausa proxima, in suits
for damages at common law, extends to the natural and probable consequences of a breach of
contract or tort, while in insurance cases.., it is limited to the immediately operating cause of
the loss or damage."); Fenton v. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443, 454 (1903) ("In an action on
[an insurance] policy, the causa proxima is alone considered in ascertaining the cause of loss;
but in cases of other contracts and in questions of tort the causa causans is by no means disre-
garded."); see also Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487, 492 (1924)
("The common understanding is that in construing these [insurance] policies we are not to
take broad views, but generally are to stop our inquiries with the cause nearest the loss.")
115. See, e.g., Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Calero Energy Co., 777 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1989); Ovbey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 613 E Supp. 726, 728-29 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Frontier
Lanes v. Can. Indem. Co., 613 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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explained by the Washington State Supreme Court in the case of Bruener v.
Turin City Fire Insurance Co.:
116
In the rare instances where proximate cause has any bearing in contract cases,
it has a different meaning than when used in tort.... In tort cases, the rules of
proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing culpability, with
which insurance cases are not concerned.... The question [in tort cases] is
always, why did the injury occur? Insurance cases are not concerned with why
the injury occurred or the question of culpability, but only with the nature of
the injury and how it happened." 7
This immediate cause rule, however, is not an inflexible nor an abso-
lute rule. The insurance policy language itself may require the application
of a proximate cause rule in some cases,"' and other circumstances may
exist where a strict application of the immediate cause rule would be unfair
and "contrary to common sense and reasonable judgment" or negate the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder to coverage. For example, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of Blaine Richards & Co. v.
Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. ofAmerica, 119 wrote,
We do not agree that proximate cause in insurance matters is to be deter-
mined by resort to "but for" causation. As this Circuit has noted, "the hor-
rendous niceties of the doctrine of so-called "proximate cause" employed in
negligence suits, apply in a limited manner to insurance policies."...At the
same time, the single cause nearest to the loss in time should not necessarily
be found to be the proximate cause.... Instead, in accord with the reasonable
understanding and [reasonable] expectations of the parties we must attempt to
ascertain..." the predominant and determining"... cause of loss.... Determi-
nation of proximate cause in these cases is thus a matter of applying common
sense and reasonable judgment as to the source of the losses alleged. °
A growing number of American courts, therefore, have rejected a strict
immediate cause rule in favor of an efficient or dominant proximate cause
rule, analogous to a tort-based proximate cause rule, in order to validate
the reasonable expectations of the insured policyholder to coverage. 2 '
116. 222 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1950).
117. 222 P.2d at 834-35 (Wash. 1950). Bruener, however, was subsequently overruled by
the case of Graham v. Public Employees Mutual Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash.
1983), which adopted the efficient or dominant proximate cause rule.
118. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815-16 (Cal.
1973); Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P2d 678, 684-85 (Colo. 1989).
119. 635 F.2d 1051 (2nd Cir. 1980) (applying New York law).
120. 635 F 2d at 1054-55 (citations omitted) see also Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1974) (similar holding).
121. See, e.g., Assurance Co. of Am. v. Jay-Mar Inc., 38 E Supp. 2d 349, 353-53 (D.NJ.
1999); see also TNT Speed & Sport Ctr. Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 E3d 731, 733 (8th
Cir. 1997) (applying Missouri law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667
(Vt. 1997).
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Under this reasonable expectations hybrid of tort and contract causation
law, there will be coverage if a risk of loss that is specifically insured against
in the insurance policy sets in motion, in an unbroken causal sequence, the
events that cause the ultimate loss, even though the last immediate cause in
the chain of causation is an excluded cause.
122
Which, then, is the better-reasoned rule: the immediate cause rule or
the efficient or dominant proximate cause rule? Clearly, the immediate
cause rule cannot be applied in all circumstances, especially when it is un-
fair and contrary to the intent and the reasonable expectations of the con-
tracting parties. On the other hand, the efficient or dominant proximate
cause rule should not be applied to insurance coverage disputes when the
initial cause in a causal chain of events is too remote. The better-reasoned
approach, therefore, in order to validate the reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties, would be to permit a court to apply either the
immediate cause rule or the efficient or dominant proximate cause rule
according to which rule would provide coverage in a particular insurance
contract dispute, especially if there was policy language that arguably was
ambiguous. 1
3
122. See, e.g., Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081 (holding that where a peril specifically insured
against set other causes in motion that, in an unbroken sequence between the act and the
final loss, produce the result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as
the proximate cause of the entire loss. It is the efficient or predominant cause that sets into
motion the chain of events producing the loss that is regarded as the proximate cause, not
necessarily the last act in a chain of events); see also John Drennon & Sons Co. v. N.H. Ins.
Co., 637 S.W2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 760 P2d 969
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (similar holdings).
123. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206
(Wash. 1994); see also ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLI1MS AND DIsPUTEs § 6.07, at 389-92
(3rd ed. 1995):
Whether a court applies the immediate cause rule [or the "efficient" or "dominant" proxi-
mate cause rule] might depend upon whether one is considering a "cause" that would ex-
clude coverage or one that would create coverage. If the policy language is ambiguous,
a court should adopt the immediate cause rule when the rule would serve to render an
exclusion inapplicable, even though the court would apply [the "efficient" or "dominant"
proximate cause rule] when applying a policy provision extending coverage.
Id. And see STEMPEL, slpra note 92, at § 7.02:
The common thread running through these decisions appears to be one in which courts
are more attracted to a strict proximity [or "immediate cause"] rule and focus on the cause
physically nearest the loss (the last event in the causal chain) where this benefits the policy-
holder in a coverage dispute, either by bringing the claim within the scope of the policy, or
avoiding the potential application of an exclusion. Conversely, where the causes physically
closest to the loss are uncovered, courts will implicitly or expressly use ["efficient" or "dom-
inant" proximate cause] analysis to find a more remote but covered peril to constitute the
"efficient proximate cause" of the loss. Not surprisingly, the tendency is more pronounced
where the potentially excluding policy language is arguably ambiguous.
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C. Multiple Concurrent Causation
American courts have utilized three different approaches with insurance
causation disputes involving multiple concurrent causation. On one ex-
treme, a minority of courts still apply a traditional conservative approach,
which tends to restrict coverage in most concurrent causation situations.
Under this traditional conservative approach, if a covered cause combines
with an excluded cause to produce a loss, then the insured cannot recover
under the policy based on the underlying rationale that an insurer should
not be held responsible for any loss caused by an excluded peril. 2 4 The
weakness of this traditional approach, however, is that the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured to coverage, even under a "common insured in
the marketplace" standard,'25 are easily frustrated and abrogated.
On the other extreme, some courts have adopted the so-called California
rule, holding that when loss occurs through the concurrence of covered
and excluded risks, the insurer would be liable for the entire loss as long as
at least one of the covered risks was a proximate cause of the loss.'26 The
advantage of this liberalized California approach, at least for the insured
policyholder, is that when various causes combine to produce an insured
loss, a dominant or predominant efficient cause need not be shown-only a
minimally sufficient proximate cause. The major disadvantage of this liber-
alized concurrent causation rule, however, is that the insurer probably never
intended to provide such broad coverage under its policy; and, not surpris-
ingly, a number of commentators in various insurance defense journals have
strongly attacked the California rule.'27
124. See, e.g., Lydick v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 187 N.W2d 602, 605 (Neb. 1971) (holding that
under this general rule, if a covered hazard combines with a hazard expressly excluded from
the policy coverage to produce a loss, the insured may not recover); Graff v. Farmer's Home
Ins. Co., 317 N.W2d 741 (Neb. 1982) (similar holding); see also Abady v. Hanover Fire Ins.
Co., 266 E2d 362 (4th Cir. 1959) (purportedly applying Virginia law); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.
Muhle, 208 E2d 191 (8th Cir. 1953) (applying Missouri law); Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222
S.W 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
125. See, e.g., Dixon v. Gunter, 636 S.W2d 437, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Barber v.
Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (both stating that
an insurance contract should be given a fair and reasonable construction consonant with
the plain intention of the parties, a construction that would be given to the contract by "an
ordinary intelligent business man" or "an average layperson who is untrained in either law
or insurance").
126. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California
law); Sabella v. Wisler, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Par-
tridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal. 1973); see also Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 454 N.E.2d
1156 (Il1. 1983); Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W2d 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Henning
Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund, 361 N.W2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Benke v. Muk-
wonago Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W2d 243 (Wis. 1982).
127. See, e.g., Houser & Kent, supra note 93; Litsey, supra note 93; Houser, supra note 93;
Wurefel & Koop, supra note 1.
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Subsequently, the California Supreme Court itself, under then-Chief
Justice Malcolm Lucas, repudiated the California rule in favor of requir-
ing a dominant or predominant efficient causal nexus involving issues of
concurrent causation.12
8
The more realistic and better-reasoned approach to concurrent causa-
tion issues in insurance coverage disputes, in order to validate both the
insurer's contractual rights and obligations as well as the insured's reason-
able expectations of coverage, would be to require the finding of a cov-
ered dominant or predominant efficient cause in any concurrent causation
controversy. Under this realistic middle ground concurrent causation ap-
proach, which is the prevailing rule in a majority of jurisdictions today, if
multiple concurrent causes exist and if the dominant or predominant ef-
ficient cause is a covered peril, then coverage would exist for the entire loss
even though other concurrent causes are not covered under the policy. 12 9 If
These commentators make a careful distinction between property insurance concurrent
causation issues (i.e., the Sabella case) and liability insurance concurrent causation issues (i.e.,
the Partridge case). In Sabella, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963), the insureds sought coverage un-
der their homeowners' policy, and they also brought a tort action against the contractor who
built their house on inadequately compacted landfill. The court held that under the property
insurance claim, the land-settling exclusion in the homeowners' policy did not preclude li-
ability because a leaking pipe was the proximate cause of the loss, not the land settling. In the
tort action, the Sabella court held that the insureds also could recover against the contractor
due to his negligent construction.
In Patridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal. 1973), no first-party policy was involved. This was
a personal liability insurance case, involving an automobile, brought by a passenger against
the driver. The passenger was injured when the insured driver negligently drove off a paved
highway while pursuing a rabbit and a .357 magnum pistol, which the insured had filed down
so the pistol would have a hair trigger, went off, injuring the passenger. The driver sought
liability coverage under both his automobile insurance policy, which covered injuries arising
out of the use of the automobile, and his homeowners' policy, which explicitly excluded inju-
ries arising out of the use of the automobile. Neither the negligent driving nor the hair trigger
alone would have caused the injury. The California Supreme Court in Partridge held thus:
[he "efficient cause" language is not very helpful, for here both causes were independent
of each other: the filing of the trigger did not "cause" the careless driving, nor vice versa.
Both, however, caused the injury. In traditional tort jargon, both are concurrent proximate
causes of the accident. Although there may be some question whether either of the two
causes in the instant case can be properly characterized as the "prime," "moving," or "ef-
ficient" cause of the accident, we believe that coverage under a liability insurance policy is
available to an insured whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate
cause of the injuries. That multiple causes may have effectuated the loss does not negate
any singe cause; that multiple acts concurred in the infliction of injury does not nullify any
single contributory act.
Patridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.10. See generally Houser & Kent, supra note 93, at 575.
128. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. 1989); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. von der Lieth, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (Cal. 1991).
129. See, e.g., Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 E2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying
Maryland law); Ovbey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 728 F.2d 178
(11 th Cir. 1986); von der Lieth, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183; Hahn v. MFA Ins. Co., 616 S.W2d 574
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Grace v. Litiz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1972); Yunker v.
Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); King v. N. River Ins. Co.,
297 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1982).
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neither cause is dominant, then loss will probably be attributed to the cause
that would result in coverage. 30
This dominant or predominant efficient concurrent causation approach
therefore is justified, not only because it honors the reasonable expectation
of the policyholder to coverage and disallows the insurer any unconscio-
nable advantage, but also because of the rationale of liberally resolving any
ambiguities regarding coverage in favor of the insured and strictly constru-
ing such ambiguities against the insurer. 3'
D. Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses in Property Insurance Policies
During the past decade or so, various insurance companies have revised
their standardized insurance policies in an apparent effort to make the
traditional conservative approach to concurrent causation'32 binding upon
the parties through express contractual language appearing within the
insurance policy itself. For example, a 1990 version of the homeowners'
property insurance form drafted by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) in-
cludes language introducing the policy's exclusions, which states thus: "We
do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following.
Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."' 33
According to Professor Robert Jerry II, by its policy terms
this language seems to say that if an excluded cause is part of any sequence
that results in a loss, the loss is not covered, even if a covered cause contributes
concurrently or sequentially to the loss. So construed, this language greatly
narrows coverage.... A windstorm (covered) that produces a large wave
(excluded) that destroys a building would be outside coverage, even if the
wind produces the wave. 134
Or perhaps not. Although a number of courts have recognized these so-
called anti-concurrent causation clauses by enforcing the insurer's exclu-
sionary policy language in overcoming the efficient or dominant proximate
cause rule and excluding coverage when loss is caused by a combination
130. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lumbennens Mut. Cas. Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145
(App. Div. 1988); Wasecu Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W2d 917, 920-23 (Minn. 1983);
Shirone, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 570 E2d 715 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Iowa law).
131. See generally ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 67 (3rd ed. 2002);
ROBERT KEETON & ALAN WDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.5 (1988); William Lasher, A Common
Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Con-
tracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982).
132. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
133. ISO, HOMEOWNERS POLicy-BRoAD FORM [HO 00 03 04 91] (1990).
134. JERRY II, supra note 131, § 67[d]. For an earlier "wind versus water" concurrent causa-
tion case that applied the traditional conservative approach denying coverage to the insured
policyholder, see Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Muhle, 208 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1953) (applying
Missouri law).
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of covered and excluded perils, " ' other courts have refused to enforce
these anti-concurrent causation clauses based on underlying public policy
reasons.1 6 Attorney Douglas Widin warns that the "danger with the anti-
concurrent causation clause is that it could in theory tempt an insurer to take
it to an unreasonable extreme, which in turn could cause a court to overreact
and construe the clause too narrowly, creating an undesirable precedent."1 37
Continuing property insurance coverage disputes resulting from the terrible
devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005 to New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast region also have attempted to deal with these concurrent
causation issues. Specifically, in the case of Buente v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 31
Senior Judge L. T SenterJr. characterized the major dispute as
whether losses attributable to "storm surge" are covered losses because the
"storm surge" is wind driven, which was covered, or whether losses attribut-
able to "storm surge" are excluded from coverage because such damages are
caused by "water" (Exclusion 4) or by "flood, including but not limited to
surface water, waves, tidal waves or overflow of any body of water, or spray
from any of these whether or not driven by wind" (Exclusion 1).' 39
In a subsequent case,14° the Buente plaintiffs asserted that these exclusions,
which the judge referred to collectively as the policy's "flood exclusions,"
135. See, e.g., Paulucci v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 E Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(applying Florida law) (recognizing that although Florida law recognized multiple concurrent
causation, the parties could contract around that law through an anti-concurrent causation
clause); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996); Ramirez v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Kula v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 628 N.YS.2d 988 (App. Div. 1995); Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d
1272 (Utah 1993).
136. See, e.g., Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 14 (W. Va. 1998) (hold-
ing that the anti-concurrent causation clause reaches a result contrary to the reasonable ex-
pectations of the policyholder to coverage); Safeco v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 415 (Wash.
1998) ("Safeco's purpose in modifying the exclusion is clear; the [anti-concurrent causation
clause] language prefacing the exclusions is an attempt to exclude from coverage losses con-
nected with certain perils no matter how insignificant those perils might have been to the loss")
(emphasis in original).
137. See Douglas Widin, Katrina, Causation, and Coverage: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?
41 ToRT & INs. L.J. 901, 925-27 (2006) (citing with approvalJulian v. Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 908 (Cal. 2005)) ("If we were to give full effect to the [anti-concurrent
causation clause] policy language excluding coverage whenever an excluded peril is a contrib-
uting or aggravating factor in the loss, we would be giving insurance companies carte blanche
to deny coverage in nearly all cases .... ) This California middle ground approach holds that
an excluded cause that makes only a minor contribution to loss will not defeat coverage, no
matter what the policy language states. Id. at 926.
138. 422 F Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
139. Id. at 696. The Allstate policy also contained Provision 15, which stated in relevant
part: "We do not cover loss to property when: (a) there are two or more causes of loss to the
covered property; and (b) the predominant cause(s) of loss is (are) excluded under Losses We
Do Not Cover...."
140. Buente v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., NO. 1:05-cv-712, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23742 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (Apr. 11, 2006).
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were ambiguous and unenforceable in the context of property damage sus-
tained in Hurricane Katrina, and plaintiffs requested partial summary judg-
ment. Defendant contended that these policy exclusions were unambiguous
and should be enforceable. The judge found the insurer's exclusions to be
clear and unambiguous and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment. 141
How should these Buente decisions be interpreted? Although the April
11, 2006, Buente decision was seen by insurers as a significant victory,142
other commentators believed that the policyholders had gained significant
ground as well. 143 In the case of Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., '44 the federal district court for the Southern District of Mississippi
found that Nationwide's anti-concurrent causation policy clause, which
purported to exclude coverage entirely for damages caused by a combina-
tion of the effects of water (an excluded loss) and damage caused by the
effects of wind (a covered loss), was ambiguous. 141
It is clear, however, that whether Hurricane Katrina's "storm surge" was
wind-driven or was subject to the insurers' various flood exclusions, these
Hurricane Katrina property insurance coverage disputes will continue to
be litigated in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama well into the foresee-
able future; and practitioners, judges, and legal commentators will await
how the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Supreme Courts interpret
and apply the insurers' anti-concurrent cause policy language.
E. Establishing a Substantial or Sufficient Causal Nexus
Even though a majority of courts apply a dominant or predominant ef-
ficient proximate cause approach to concurrent causation insurance cov-
erage disputes, 146 one commentator, Craig Litsey, notes that the major
problem with this proximate cause approach is that "courts have applied
the concept inconsistently by giving different meanings to various aspects
of the concept at different times.' 1 47 Ultimately, he concedes that courts
and juries must rely on "common sense and reasonable judgment" to
identify what constitutes a dominant or substantial cause of loss; and, as
Professor William Lloyd Prosser observes, this is a decision "upon which
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Daniel Hays, Insurers Win Big Round in Flood Case, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
(Prop. & Cas. Ed.), Apr. 24, 2006, at 8.
143. See, e.g., Peter Geier, Judges Play Katrina Suits Down the Middle, NAT'L L.J., July 3,
2006, at 6 ("Judge Senter gave homeowners the chance to prove that wind destroyed the
premises before the flood got there, which was a big win for homeowners. But he also main-
tained the integrity of the insurer's flood exclusion.") (quoting attorney Randy Maniloff).
144. 438 E Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
145. Id. at 693.
146. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
147. See Litsey, supra note 93, at 436-37.
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all the learning, literature and lore of the law are largely lost. It is a mat-
ter upon which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as the
most experienced court." 1
48
So, query: Are these legal causation concepts just another judicial weapon
utilized by legal formalists 149 and legal functionalists150 in their continuing
battle for the "heart and soul" of insurance contract law?' Not necessarily,
because whether a judge is a legal formalist or a legal functionalist, judges
within both these jurisprudential schools still agree that if a disputed insur-
ance contract is deemed to be of questionable coverage or is unfair to the
parties involved, then a judge does have the right and the power to address
this contractual dispute through a number of well-recognized contractual
remedies," 2 and through insurance causation principles as well.
148. Id. (citing PEOSSER ON TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971)).
149. Legal formalism, also known as legal positivism, is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are determined by preexisting judicial and legislative precedent, and a judge
must interpret the law in a logical, socially neutral manner. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, For-
malism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how legal formalism still serves a legitimate func-
tion today in limiting judicial discretion and judicial activism).
In an insurance law context, legal formalism is best exemplified by the seminal writings
and major influence of Professor Samuel Williston relating to American contract law in gen-
eral and American insurance law in particular. The bedrock principle underlying Williston's
formalistic view of insurance contract interpretation is that an insurance policy must be con-
strued and enforced according to general principles of contract law, and courts therefore
are not at liberty to reinterpret or modify the terms of a clearly written and unambiguous
insurance policy but must look at the "plain meaning" of the insurance contract. 2 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:3 (4th ed. 1998). See generally Swisher, supra note 90,
at 748-52.
150. Legal functionalism, also known as legal realism, is based on the belief that the for-
malist theory of a logical and socially neutral legal framework is rarely attainable, and may
be undesirable, in a changing society; and the paramount concern of the law should not be
logical consistency, but socially desirable consequences. Thus, where legal formalism is more
logically based and precedent-oriented, legal functionalism is more sociologically based and
result-oriented. See, e.g., GARY AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
In an insurance law context, legal functionalism is best exemplified by the seminal writings
and major influence of Professor Arthur Corbin relating to American contract law in general
and American insurance law in particular. Professor Corbin was a major critic of Professor
Williston's plain meaning analysis of insurance contracts. According to Professor Corbin,
"The main purpose of contract law is the realization of the reasonable expectations" of the
contracting parties, and there "is no single rule of interpretation of language, and there are
no rules of interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to the one correct under-
standing and meaning." 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1:1 (rev. ed. 1993).
See generally Swisher, supra note 90, at 753-58.
151. See generally, Jerry II, slipra note 107; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales
in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1074 (1991)
("It is not enough, therefore, to understand insurance law 'in the books' and insurance law
'in action.' One must also know the judge-and understand the jurisprudential philosophy of
each particular court.")
152. See, e.g., Swisher, supra note 90, at 755:
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Accordingly, numerous courts and juries have agonized over many years,
and many insurance coverage disputes, to determine how substantial or
sufficient a causal nexus needs to be, but there does not appear to be any
overarching rule to answer this basic question. For example, in fire and
property insurance coverage disputes, the courts are split as to whether
or not damage by heat, smoke, or soot would come within fire insurance
coverage as a "direct loss' s3 caused by fire.154 Although some courts in-
terpret a direct loss caused by fire to require actual ignition, burning, or
charring,S' the better-reasoned reasonable expectations modem approach
would allow recovery for smoke and soot damage along a direct causal
chain of events constituting a direct loss caused by fire.
Is6
Automobile liability insurance coverage disputes likewise frequently in-
volve the determination of a causal nexus from loss "arising out of the own-
ership, maintenance, or use" of an automobile or another insured vehicle.
Although some earlier courts have applied a very restrictive interpretation
of the word use of an automobile to mean the actual "operation" of the ve-
hicle,"5 7 a majority of courts today have held that the use of an automobile
is not necessarily synonymous with driving or operating the vehicle, and
Accordingly Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston-was not willing to reject a number
of well-established rules of contract interpretation in pursuit of his more functional and
contextual approach to contract law, and Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston-
therefore continued to recognize a large number of traditional interpretive rules of contract
interpretation to help ascertain the parties' reasonable expectation to coverage, including:
contract ambiguity and the doctrine of contra proferentem; contract unconscionability and
public policy issues; and equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory
estoppel, election, and reformation of contract. A fair reading of both Williston on Contracts
and Corbin on Contracts therefore suggests that there are far more similarities than differ-
ences in their respective approaches to contract law in general, and insurance coverage
disputes in particular.
Id.
153. Proximate cause in the construction of an insurance policy generally is synonymous
with direct cause, and efficient cause generally means dominant or predominant cause.
154. See, e.g., A.M. Vann, Annotation, Loss by Heat, Smoke, or Soot Without External Ignition
as Within a Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 17 A.L.R.3d 1155 (1968). This annotation also dis-
cusses the archaic, but still widely recognized, insurance law distinction between a "friendly"
fire and a "hostile" fire.
155. See, e.g., Wash. State Hop Producers Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 660 P.2d 768 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that there was no evidence of any flame or glow to constitute a
direct loss by fire when 253 bales of hops stored in plaintiff's warehouse were damaged by
"browning").
156. See, e.g., Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 98 N.W2d 280
(Minn. 1959) (an off-premises fire set in motion a train of events that brought about the
smoke and soot damage of which plaintiff complained, thus constituting a direct loss caused
by fire). See generally Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes:
Towarda Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIo ST. LJ. 543, 625-28 (1996).
157. See, e.g., Kienstra v. Madison County Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1942) (defining use as the "operation" of the vehicle).
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it is sufficient to show only that the accident was "connected with," "grew
out of," or "flowed from" the use of the automobile." 8
The courts are split, however, as to whether a substantial causal nexus in-
volving the use of a vehicle is required"5 9 or whether only a minimal or suf-
ficient causal nexus is required in order to validate the insured's reasonable
expectation to coverage. 160 This same causal conundrum is illustrated in a
number of cases discussing whether the accidental discharge of a firearm
in an automobile constitutes the use of that vehicle for automobile liability
insurance coverage purposes. Not surprisingly, the courts are split on this
causal issue as well.
16 1
So is this causation conundrum between a substantial and a sufficient
causal nexus in automobile insurance coverage disputes just one more ex-
ample of the continuing jurisprudential battle between legal formalists and
legal functionalists for the "heart and soul" of insurance contract law?
162
158. See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 732 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying
Montana Law); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 691 P.2d 1289 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). See
generally Larry D. Schaefer, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What Are Accidents or
Injuries "Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, and Use" of an Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R.4th 10
(1982); George Sayers, Coverage Problems Relating to the Policy Term "Arising out of the Use" of
a Vehicle, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 253 (1969).
159. A "substantial" causal nexus generally would involve a dominant or predominant ef-
ficient cause.
160. Compare Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Logan, 451 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1982)
(holding that an automobile insurer was not liable to its insured for an accident "arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the automobile when the injury resulted from the
insured's fall in an icy automobile parking lot), with Novak v. GEICO, 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an insured was covered for loss "arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use" of her automobile when she was shot in her driveway after refusing
an assailant's request to give him a ride in her car).
161. Compare Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 236 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977),
and Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Lott, 273 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Texas law) (both finding
coverage existed), with U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W Fire Ins. Co., 450 S.W2d 491 (Ky. 1970),
and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 645 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975) (both finding no coverage existed). See also Swisher, supra note 156, at 625-29.
162. See, e.g., Jerry II, supra note 107, at 55-56:
On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose champions are Professor Williston and
the first RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRcArs. The formalists care mightily about texts and the
four corners of documents. They believe that words often have a plain meaning that exists
independently of any sense in which the speaker or writer may intend the words. They in-
sist that a court or a party can discern the meaning of contractual language without asking
about the intentions or expectations of the parties. They contend that interpretation is
appropriate only if an ambiguity appears on the face of the document, which means that
the parties by their own testimony about what they intended or expected cannot create an
ambiguity where none exists.... In the world of the formalists, an insurer that drafts a clear
form should be entitled to rely on that form in setting rates without worrying that a court
will disregard the finely tuned, clear language.... The other contestants in the battle for the
soul of contract law are the functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progres-
sives, the realists, or the post-classicists. The champions of this side are Professor Corbin
and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). The functionalists care less about
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Not entirely. Although most courts still require a dominant or substan-
tial causal nexus to exist between a covered risk and the resulting loss, an
important underlying public policy rationale for automobile liability in-
surance is to secure compensation for the third-party victims of highway
accidents as well as provide liability coverage for insured policyholders;'63
and this underlying public policy factor explains in large part why many
courts today in automobile insurance coverage disputes often apply a mini-
mal or sufficient causal nexus test rather than a more substantial causal
nexus test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal causation requirements, in both tort and insurance law practice, are
among the most pervasive yet most elusive and most misunderstood of all
legal concepts in Anglo-American law. Tort and insurance law practitio-
ners, however, must deal with these legal causation issues on a daily basis,
and there are some general guidelines for understanding and negotiating
this often-misunderstood conceptual quagmire of pleading and proving
legal causation requirements.
In a tort law context, "but for" causation and proximate causation both
are required elements for any intentional tort, strict liability in tort, or
negligence cause of action, especially in cases involving issues of multiple
concurrent causation. Proximate (or legal) causation does not really in-
volve causation at all but instead is a policy decision made by the courts to
limit liability based upon underlying public policy grounds. However, the
proximate cause rationale for a limitation of liability based upon underly-
ing public policy reasons was not created in a vacuum, and most courts
today in determining whether a defendant's act, or omission to act, was too
remote or did in fact constitute the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries
still justify their decisions based upon concepts of foreseeability, including
(1) the foreseeability of the plaintiff or a rescuer; (2) the foreseeability of
harm in a direct causal chain of events, including a particular manner of
harm versus general type of harm argument and whether or not the causal
the text of contracts, believing it to be most useful as an articulation of the objective mani-
festations of the contracting parties and as a means to understanding their intentions and
expectations.... Text does not have inherent meaning, but text means what the drafter or
speaker knows or should know the other side will understand those words to mean in con-
text.... Where a form is standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable
expectations for whatever the particular recipient of the form understood, given that the
recipient has less reason to know what the drafter means, while the drafter has insights into
what the ordinary, reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand.
Id.
163. See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 131, at 385-86.
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sequence of events was highly extraordinary and therefore unforeseeable;
(3) the foreseeability and unforeseeability of intervening causes; and (4) the
foreseeability or unforeseeability of the extent of harm.
Because most analysis and research in the field of legal causation primar-
ily has occurred in the field of tort law and because insurance law is some-
what of a hybrid between tort and contract law, a number of American
courts have applied classic tort causation principles to insurance coverage
disputes as well. Beginning with Benjamin Cardozo's landmark decision in
Bird, however, a growing number of American courts have begun to realize
that although most insurance cases still require direct "but for" causation
similar to tort law, insurance proximate cause issues are not solely based on
a foreseeability of harm but are also based on the reasonable expectations
of the contracting parties.
Accordingly, over the past nine decades, American courts and juries have
struggled mightily to analyze and resolve various insurance causation is-
sues from a number of different perspectives. Some courts determine cov-
erage by applying an immediate cause rationale, while other courts employ
an efficient proximate cause chain of events doctrine similar to tort law or
utilize a hybrid approach combining both of these rules. The courts like-
wise have employed no less than three different insurance law approaches
to address multiple concurrent causation issues, and they have disagreed
on whether an efficient proximate cause approach requires a substantial
causal nexus or only a sufficient causal nexus.
But regardless of which particular standards a practitioner or a court
may employ in attempting to resolve specific tort or insurance causation
issues-and there are a number of divergent approaches-these interpre-
tive rules still must be sufficiently malleable and flexible when applied to
differing circumstances and conditions to protect the rights of injured
plaintiffs in tort cases and the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties in insurance cases, however these legal causation concepts are ulti-
mately determined by a court or by a trier of fact.
In both tort law and insurance law, then, "common sense and reasonable
judgment"; a "rough sense of justice"; and "logic, common sense, and pub-
lic policy" ultimately will resolve most of these legal causation issues.
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